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In this article two interrelated aspects of the English court's jurisdiction over an
action containing foreign elements will be examined. The first is the exercise of
the court's discretion to grant a stay of English proceedings where jurisdiction has
been founded as of right. Jurisdiction is so founded where, for example, a writ is
served on the defendant who is present within the jurisdiction at the time of the
service of the writ. The second is the exercise of the court's discretion to grant
leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction under RSC Order II r.1(l). Such leave
will be required if the defendant is not within the jurisdiction at the time of service.
The analysis of these issues will be made in the light of the important decision in
Spiliada Man'time Corpn. v. Cansulex Ltd ([he Spiliada/ in which the court, for the
first time, elaborated a coherent principle that can be applied to both Order II and
stay situations.
Order II and stay: the pre-Spiliada rules
Prior to The Spiliada it was unclear to what extent the principles governing the
exercise of the court's discretion to grant a stay and those in relation to the exercise
of its discretion under Order II were co-extensive.
In relation to stay, the grant of a refusal to stay of English proceedings had, since
1978, turned on the two-stage test propounded by Lord Diplock in MacSha1l11Onv.
Rockware Glass Ltd.;2
"In order to grant a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive, one
negative: (a) the defendant must satisfY the court that there is another forum
to whose jurisdiction he is amenable in which justice can be done between the
parties at substantially less inconvenience and eX'}Jensejand (b) the stay must
not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage which
would be available to him ifhe invoked the jurisdiction of the English court."
"Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham.
1. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843.
2. [1978] A.C. 795, at p.812.
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Prior to this test, discretion to grant or refuse staywas based on the question of
whether the English proceedings could be said to be "oppressive or vexatious". 3
The oppressive or vexatious test proved unduly burdensome on the party seeking
stay since, self-evidently, to prove that something is "oppressive" is no easy task.
However, Lord Diplock's approach in MacShannon has produced its own special
problems. For example, it has been disputed whether Lord Diplock introduced the
defendent,,7 and then somehow reach a balance between the two. This could be
Laws.4 According t~ this concept the court had to consider ~hether there is
another competent tribunal which is more suitable for the trial of the case in the
interests of the parties and of justice.5 If so, then a stay should be granted. The
consequence of this uncertainty is that it has been unclear whether the courts
should refer exclusively to Scottish criteria when deciding whether a stay should
be granted or not. Further the balance between the (a) and the (b) branches of
Lord Diplock's MacShannon test was never clear. However, if both were satisfied
then the court had no choice but to determine the "critical equation" as explained
by Lord Wilberforce in The Atlantic Star. 6 According to this, the court must "take
into account (i) any advantage to the plaintiff, (ii) any disadvantage to the
defenda~t',7 and then somehow reach a balance between the two. This could be
difficult since any advantage to the plaintiff was likely to be neutralised by a
disadvantage to the defendant. Also, as Lord Wilberforce himself stated, the
resolution of the "critical equation" was likely to be by way of an "instinctive
process".8 Yet, surely, reason demands that the exercise of such a discretion
should have more legal content than mere "instinct". In relation to Order II, leave
could be refused where England was not the forum conveniens9 because, for
example, of the locality of the parties or the witnesses. 10 There has never been any
recondite guiding principle governing the exercise of this discretion of the
MacShannon kind. The court has simply identified such matters as expense and
inconvenience as possible grounds for refusing leave.
The question now is what effect The Spiliada has had upon these principles.
The Spiliada
In The Spiliada the court was concerned with the exercise of its discretion to
grant leave to serve out of the jurisdiction under Order II r. 1 (l)(f)(iii). This
3. SI. Pierre v. Soulh American Siores (Galh and Chaves) Ltd. [1936] 1 K.B. 382.
4. In MacSh(lll/lon itself, whereas Lord Diplock expressed the view that his reinstatement of the
principles must be indistinguisable from the principle of forum /1011 crJllveniens,Lord Salmon expressly
rejected any adoption of that latter principle: [19781 A.C. 795, at pp.81 2,822 and 817. See also, Adrian
Briggs, [1984J Legal Siudies 74.
5. Sim v. RobinolV (1892) 19 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 665.
6. The Allanlic Slar [1974J A.C. 436, at p.468.
7. Ibid ..
8. Ibid ..
9. Maroux v. Sociedade Commercial Abel Pereira da Fonseca S.A.R.L. [1972J I W.L.R. 962 and G.A.F.
Corporalion v. Anchem Products Inc. [1975J I Lloyd's L.R. 601.
10. Sec, e.g., Sodhe Generale de Paris v. Dreyfus Brothers (1885) 29 Ch.D. 239, at p.242.
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sub-rule of Order II r.1 deals with the situation where a contract is "by its terms or
by implication governed by English law", which all courts in The Spiliada saga
agreed was, on the facts, the proper law. II The plaintiffs, the Liberian owners of
The Spiliada, wanted to commence proceedings in England against Cansulex Ltd.
in respect of corrosion caused to the ship when wet sulphur was loaded aboard it.
The leave, which had been granted at first instance and then discharged by the
Court of Appeal, was reinstated by the House of Lords.
Though the case was particularly concerned with Order II, Lord Goff (giving
the leading judgment) took the opportunity to review both the principles relating to
that Order and those relating to the grant of a stay of English proceedings which
have been founded as of right. 12 In doing so he identified what, in his view, was the
fundamental principle applicable to both. The court, he said, should exercise its
discretion in favour of that forum in which the case could be tried more suitably for
the interests of the parties and the needs of justice, i.e. the "appropriate forum"Y
The "appropriate forum" was that with which the case has its closest and most real
connection.14 The fact that the plaintiff might be deprived of a legitimate
advantage if leave is refused or a stay granted is obviously relevant to this issue but
by no means conclusive. IS
By using the test of closest, most real connection, the English court was found to
be the appropriate forum and so leave was reinstated. This decision was reached
by consideration of, inter alia, the "Cambridgeshire factor" which in the event
proved decisive.16 The Cambridgeshire, an English owned ship, had also been
damaged by the wet sulphur. Its owners had already commenced proceedings in
England against Cansulex Ltd., when Spiliada Maritime Corporation sought leave
under Order II. Both ships were supported by the same insurers and both of the
ship's owners had briefed the same solicitors. The combination of the preparatory
work done by the Cambridgeshire team together with the fact that English law
governed the contract between Spiliada Maritime Corporation and Cansulex Ltd.,
led to the conclusion that England was the appropriate jurisdiction for the trial of
the action. 17
II. The Spiliada [1985] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 116 (C.A.).
12. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.853.
13. Ibid., at pp.853-54. According to Lord Goff, the burden of proving the appropriate forum under
Order 11falls on the party seeking leave. In relation to stay it falls on the party seeking a stay.
14. Ibid., at p.856. The ancillary significance of all this is a new departure for the 'closest and most real
connection' test which began its life in contract and then spilled over by analogy into torts, and more
recently has been recommended by the Law Commission in Report No. 168 for application in assessing
the domicile of children. Is there room, then, for a prediction that all conflicts' issues will ultimately be
resolved by applying this test?
IS. Ibid., at p.859.
16. Ibid., at pp.861-62.
17. Ibid ..
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The relationship between Order II and stay
Whether the court is being asked to grant a stay of English proceedings or leave
is being sought under Order II, the same issue is at stake: should the matter be
tried in England or in some other jurisdiction? Lord Goffs authoritative statement
that there is a general underlying principle in relation to both Order II and stay is,
therefore, to be welcomed. It provides a composite framework according to which
the English court can properly take jurisdiction and allow English proceedings to
continue or, conversely, refuse to assume jurisdiction altogether. Nevertheless, if
this statement is examined in more depth, an important distinction between Order
II and stay situations arises which casts doubt on the general applicability of the
composite principle to both situations.
According to Lord Goff, when considering Order II, the English court should
find that it clearly provides "the appropriate forum". 18 Where a stay is requested it
should be granted if there is "another clearly more appropriate forum", failing
which a stay should ordinarily be refused.19 Though the matter is not explored
further, it is submitted that this distinction is not merely verbal. The implication is
that in the latter situation there are legitimate competing.fOri in accordance with
coherent principles but something further makes a particular foreign forum the
more appropriate one in all the circumstances of the case. However, in the former
situation there is no room for competing.fOri in accordance with such principles;
the English court must be the only appropriate forum. Moreover this distinction is
desirable for, as Barma and Elvin have suggested, English judges should avoid the
appearance of undue judicial chauvinism.2o For example, they should not arrogate
to themselves an unwarrantably wide jurisdiction. In order to achieve this, it is
necessary for there to be a difference of approach towards Order II and stay.
To take stay first. As has been seen, the MacShannon test happily relaxed the
former, burdensome requirement that a party must show that the English
proceedings were "oppressive or vexatious"Y The Spiliada conception of the
appropriate forum (forum non conveniens) provides another "new departure" and is
particularly valuable given that it should enable the English court to grant a stay
more readily and flexibly in cases where jurisdiction founded as of right is
in appropriate.22 In this way it should ensure that the English court will not assume
an unwarrantably wide jurisdiction. However, these advantages do not apply with
equal force to the exercise of the court's discretion under Order II, since that
Order already gives the court the power to assume an extended jurisdiction. Thus,
so that the court will not assume an unwarrantably wide jurisdiction it should be
more rigorous in its application of the "appropriate forum" test in relation to
18. Ibid., at p.8S8 (emphasis added).
19. Ibid., at pp.8S4-S6 (emphasis added).
20. Barma and Elvin, [1985] L.QR. 48, at p.SS.
21. Supra, at p.68.
22. E.g., where the writ is served on a defendant whilst he is only temporarily present within the
jurisdiction and there are other substantial factors connecting the case with an alternative forum.
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Order II than in stay proceedings. In practice, this goal will be achieved by the
distinction between proving the English court to be the appropriate forum and
proving that there is another more appropriate forum for a stay to be granted, for it
is more difficult to prove the former than the latter.
The doctrine of the appropriate forum
In adopting the principle of the appopriate forum the House of Lords in The
Spiliada has cast doubt on the future use of the phrase ftrum non conveniens.
Indeed, Lord Goff doubted "whether the Latin tag 'fOrum non conveniens' is apt to
describe this principle." In particular, by drawing on the classical statement of the
doctrine by Lord Kinnear in Sim v. Robinow23 he emphasised that the issue is not
merely one of practical convenience.24 Rather, a variety of factors have to be taken
into account when establishing the appropriateness of the forum. These factors
include not just those of expense and convenience but also, for example, the law
governing any relevant transaction.25 This shift of emphasis now requires
establishing what may alternatively be referred to as an objectively determined
proper forum for the trial of the dispute, that forum with which the action has its
closest and most real connection.26 The objectivity of this process is not to be
undermined by giving undue weight to any legitimate advantage of which the
plaintiff may be deprived should leave be refused or a stay granted, for, as Lord
Goff noted, "simply to give the plaintiff his advantage at the eJI.:pense of the
defendant is not consistent with the objective approach inherent in Lord Kinnear's
statement of principle in Sim v. Robinow.' 27This is reflected in the decision on the
facts in The Spiliada. The plaintiff had claimed as a legitimate advantage, for
bringing the proceedings in England, the expiry of the British Columbia limitation
period leaving them with no alternative but to proceed in England. In the view of
the House of Lords the decisive factor indicating the English court as the
appropriate forum was the Cambridgeshire factor not the limitation.28
The adoption of the principle of the appropriate forum is timely. It shifts the
emphasis away from Lord Diplock's two stage test in MacShannon (as
supplemented by Lord Wilberforce's "critical equation" conception in TheAtlantic
Star) and the problems that that test involved,29 to a single composite test, the
latter test being readily explicable, theoretically simple to operate and already
"notorious" in other branches of the law.3D Of course, the "appropriate forum"
test is not without its own rather obvious difficulties. The court has to consider an
apparently seamless web of connecting factors. The consideration of these factors
23. (1892) 19 R. (Ct. of Sess.) 665, at p.668.
24. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.853.
25. Ibid., at p.856.
26. Supra, at p.69.
27. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.859.
28. Supra, at p.69. The legitimate advantage point was treated obiter: [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.86i..
29. Supra, at p.68.
30. See comment, supra n.l4.
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should not disintegrate into an "instinctive" process, however we define that, for
otherwise the lawwould be put back into the position it was under MacShannonY
Yet just how the court is to assess all the connecting factors remains to be seen.
This difficulty may be demonstrated by reference to the Court of Appeal's first
attempts to apply The Spi/iada in Du Pont v. Agnew32 and Charm Maritime v.
Kyriakou.33 Both cases were concerned with stay and in both the Court of Appeal
can be criticised for giving undue weight to one connecting factor indicating
England as the more appropriate jurisdiction when other factors pointed to a
legitimate alternative.
In Du Pont v. Agnew the court was faced with multi-party insurance claims
arising out of a tort which had occurred in Illinois. None of the insurance policies
contained a choice of law clause and so the Court of Appeal, treating a Lloyd's
policy as the "lead" or principal policy, determined that English law was the
proper law thereof (and therefore of all the other related policies). The particular
issue concerned an indemnity which, according to English law as the proper law,
could only be denied as a matter of English public policy.34Thus, the Court of
Appeal found the English court to be the more appropriate forum for the
determination of that issue because it was the more appropriate tribunal to assess
the extent of English public policy.35Therefore, despite substantial connecting
factors pointing to Illinois as the more appropriate jurisdiction (inter alia, the tort
was committed there, the award giving rise to this particular litigation was made
there and the Illinois courts were in a better position to analysewhat had happened
in respect of corporate responsibility for' the injury),36 a stay of English
proceedings was refused,
Similarly, in the Charm Maritime case a stay was refused where the particular
issue concerned a trust deed, the governing law of which was arguably English. 10
Since Greek law (being the law of the other possible appropriate forum) did not
recognise the concept of a trust, England was found to be the more appropriate
jurisdiction despite substantial connections between the case and Greece given,
for example, that the parties to the dispute were Greek and the dispute itself had
arisen there.38
It may be that these cases can be explained on the basis that, as Lord Goff
emphasised in The Spiliada, "appropriateness" is not a synonym for "mere
convenience".40 The forum should arguably be legally appropriate rather than
31. Supra, at p.67.
32. [1987] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 585.
33. [1987] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 433.
34. [1987] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 585, at p.594.
35. Ibid..
36. Ibid., at p.593.
37. [1987] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 443, at pp.439, 451.
38. Ibid., at p.451.
39. [1987] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 585, at p.595 and [1987] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 433. at p.448.
40. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.853.
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merely factually convenient. What made England the more legally appropriate
jurisdiction in Du Pont was the existence of an overriding English rule of public
policy that could determine when the right to an indemnity could be denied. In
Charm Maritime the absence of a law of trusts in Greece inexorably made England
the more legally appropriate jurisdiction. Yet clearly the English courts should be
wary of treating the fact that English law is the law governing the issue as
determinative of the more appropriate forum if they are not to appear chauvinistic.
On the whole, in these cases, the Court of Appeal seemed to give undue weight to
English law as the law governing the issue.
Moreover, in Du Pont and Charm Maritime the Court of Appeal arguably
fundamentally misapplied The Spiliada by finding England to be the more
appropriate jurisdiction. According to Lord Goff in The Spiliada, if no other more
appropriate forum than the English court can be established then ordinarily a stay
should be refused anyway.41 It is not necessary for the court to find that it is the
more appropriate forum. Thus, where "appropriateness" can be said to be
balanced between factual convenience and legal convenience, this giving rise to no
other clearly more appropriate forum, a stay should be refused. In Du Pont and
Charm Maritime it was open to the court to take this route and so refuse a stay on
this basis alone.
The logical force of the general underlying principle of the "appropriate forum"
as expressed in The Spiliada was considered by Steyn] in Att.-Gen. v. Arthur
Andersen CS Co..42 In that case the court was faced with a request for a stay of
English proceedings not by the defendant but by the plaintiff who had actually
brought those proceedings. The plaintiff had commenced proceedings against
Andersen's in New York but, anticipating arguments disputing the jurisdiction of
the New York court, had also served a protective writ in England. The plaintiff
then sought a stay of these English proceedings pending the outcome of the
dispute as to the New York court's jurisdiction. He was successful. Though the
judgment is not remarkable for its clarity, it seems that Steyn] treated the case as a
novel one in which the relevant principles applicable might "be regarded as a
gloss,,43 on those contained in The Spiliada. The gloss was as follows: "Has it been
shown that it is unjust, because it was vexatious or oppressive, to allow the English
proceedings to be pursued pending the decision of the New York court?,,44
Though not stated it must presumably have been "vexatious or oppressive" to the
plaintiff.
The extent to which Steynl's test is a gloss on The Spiliada requires analysis. In
Andersen's case a stay was granted on the basis that it was "vexatious or oppressive"
to compel the plaintiff to continue with the English proceedings in the light of
41. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.856.
42. The Times, 13 October 1987, Lexis Transcript for 8 October 1987.
43. Ibid..
44. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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undertakings which the plaintiff had invited the defendant to accept.45 It was not
granted on the basis that New York was the appropriate jurisdiction by reason of
being that with which the action was most closely connected. Thus, the "vexatious
or oppressive" test was not being used euphemistically to refer to the appropriate
forum. Rather, it seems that the court was weighing the respective advantages and
disadvantages to the parties of a grant of stay. It was onlywhen the judge turned to
consider the professional involvement in the case that he concluded that "New
York rather than London is at present the centre ofgravity."46 Self-evidently this is
consistent with The Spiliada since the concept of a "centre of gravity" mirrors, at
least in a rough and ready way, the notion of the "appropriate forum" as one with
which the proceedings are most closely connected; even more so given the House
of Lords' reliance in The Spiliada on the feature of professional involvement, i.e.
the Cambridgeshire factor.47 If this is correct, then the use of the words "vexatious
or oppressive" is misleading, doubly so since the "oppressive or vexatious" test
was expressly discarded by the House of Lords in relation to stay in 1978.48 It
would have been preferable for Steyn J either to have more clearly defined
"vexatious or oppressive" as a test in its own right, or to have adopted The Spiliada
as a general approach and used the "vexatious or oppressive" concept as a feature
which might point to New York as the appropriate jurisdiction. As it is, the
approach he took represents an unhappy mixture of the two and will clearly require
future scrutiny.
Conclusion
The House of Lords in The Spiliada has wrought changes in the principles
governing the exercise of the court's discretion in the two areas of Order II and
stay proceedings. Two clear points have emerged. First, the same principle
underlies the exercise of discretion in relation to both Order II and stay.49
Secondly, that principle is that of the appropriate forum.50 In this regard it has
been argued that the House of Lords has done more than merely accept the
doctrine of fOrum non conveniens. It has transposed that doctrine into that of the
"appropriate forum". Given Lord Goff's adoption of what is "appropriate" rather
than "convenient", 51 it may be misleading for future courts to talk in terms of
fimun non conveniens.
However, as has been seen, The Spiliada merely provides a basic framework for
the guidance both of those who professionally advise clients on the question of the
exercise of the court's discretion in relation to Order II and stay and the judges
45. Ibid ..
46. Ibid. (emphasis added).
47. Supra, at p.4.
48. MacShmlUon v. Rockware Glass Ltd [19781 A.C. 795.
49. Supra, at p.69.
50. Supra, at p.69.
51. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843, at p.854.
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who actually exercise that discretion. This raises serious doubts as to whether
Lord Templeman's cri de coeur in The Spiliada that submissions on Order II and
stay "will be measured in hours not days" will be answered.52 It is not without
significance that the two cases on stay53 subsequent to The Spiliada found their way
to the Court of Appeal.
52. [198613 All E.R. 843, at p.847.
53. Du POIlI and Chann Maritime, supra, nn.32, 33.
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